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I In his famous article, the late Professor William Cary used the bottom as a metaphor
for lax, pro-management fiduciary duties. The thesis of his article was that Delaware, in
order to attract corporations to incorporate in the state, established a regime of corporate laws
that offered little protection for shareholders, while allowing managers the opportunity to
operate without effective monitoring or limitations on their self-serving activities. William
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (I974). His
article generated an intense and interesting debate that is well captured in WILLIAM L. CARY &
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 125-32 (7th ed. 1995).
2 Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. is the Alumni Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky
College of Law.
My thanks to Bill Callison, Tom Rutledge and Allan Vestal, who offered comments on
this article.
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INTRODUCTION

O

the last decade or so, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has promulgated a series of uniform laws dealing with unincorporated business entities. 3 The Uniform
Partnership Act (1997) (RUPA),4 the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(2001) (ULPA (2001)), 5 and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(1996) (ULLCA) 6 are recent and important iterations of these uniform
laws. One or more of these Acts have been adopted in many states 7 and are
certain to garner additional adoptions in the coming years.8
VER

3 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is
composed of Commissioners from all the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
Commissioners are usually appointed by their respective state governors or legislatures.
When NCCUSL decides to consider a particular subject such as, in our case, laws governing partnerships, limited partnerships or limited liability companies, it will appoint a Special
Committee of Commissioners to prepare the various drafts of the particular act, which are
then submitted to the Commissioners for review and recommendations. Once approved by
the Commissioners, the proposed uniform act may be submitted for consideration by the ABA.
See, 6 U.L.A. III-IV (pt. I) (zoo); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 2006-2007 REFERENCE BOOK, at 9.
4 UNIF P'srnp ACT, 6 U. L. A. 58-274 (pt. I) ('997).
5 UNiF. LTD. P'SHIP AcT, 6A U. L.A. 9-123 (2001).
6 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, 6A U. L. A. 560-650 (1996). A new version of a limited liability company act, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA), has
been approved by NCCUSL and awaits final approval by the American Bar Association. That
Act makes significant changes in the fiduciary duties of managers as compared to those duties in RUPA and ULLCA. The fiduciary duty standards of RULLCA are the subject of
a forthcoming article by the author, The New Fiduciary Standards Under the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act: We Just Can't Seem to Get It Right. No state has yet adopted the
RULLCA.
7 As of December 28, 2007, NCCUSL's website, www.nceusl.org, reported the following numbers of adoptions by states and territories in the United States. Thirty-five states
and territories had adopted RUPA. Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
Fourteen states had adopted ULPA (2001). Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.
orgfUpdate/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ulpa.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). Nine
states and territories had adopted ULLCA. Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.
orglUpdate/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ullca.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
8 For example, during its zoo6 legislative session, Kentucky adopted RUPA, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 362. i-i01-362.1-1205 (West 2oo6), and ULPA (2001), Ky. REV. STAT, ANN. §§
362.2-102-362.2-1207 (West zOO6).
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Each of the Acts contains provisions that prescribe the fiduciary duties
of the entity's managers. 9 The managers" duties are articulated in the
familiar terms of duties of care and duties of loyalty and are largely default
rules that are subject to opt out rights by the parties. The fiduciary duty
provisions are essentially identical in all three of the Acts."
The fiduciary duties in these Acts are to a significant degree unsatisfactory. In various and important ways, they promote outcomes that are unfair
and inefficient.
The duties of care and loyalty in RUPA, ULPA (2001) and ULLCA are
excessively pro-management. They seem designed to promote managers'
pecuniary interests in achieving an inefficient and unfair bargain with the
entity's investors regarding the nature of managers' fiduciary duties."2 The
statutory standards themselves are overly lax and limited. 3 The standards
offer inadequate protection for the legitimate interests and expectations
of investors regarding the standards of care and loyalty that they are due
from their managers. The opt out provisions in the Acts offer managers the
opportunity to exacerbate this bad situation by further exploiting informational asymmetries and thus capturing for themselves additional pecuniary
gains by constructing an even more inefficient and unfair bargain with their
investors. 4
The fundamental problem with the Acts' fiduciary duty standards is
that they abandon widely-accepted and morally and economically pleas-

9 Before the adoption of the uniform acts, the fiduciary duties of managers of unincorporated business entities were promulgated and interpreted by courts through the common
law process, principally in the context of general partnership law. The 1914 version of the
Uniform Partnership Act, for example, had only one provision that imposed any significant
fiduciary duties on persons managing general partnerships: UNIF. P'sHip ACT § 21, 6 U. L. A.
194 (pt. II) (1914) (amended I997) (obligating partners to account for profits derived by her
or him from transactions with the partnership). As a result, fiduciary duties under the UPA
largely developed through the common law; e.g., Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.zd 574 (Ky. 1982);
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
io Throughout this paper, I use the term manager to mean the one person who exercises management control over the entity. In a partnership or limited partnership, the person
performing the management function will likely be one or more of the general partners. In
a manager-managed LLC, the person performing the management function will likely be a
manager, while in a member-managed LLC, the person performing the management function will likely be one or more of the LLC's members.
ii In APPENDIX A to this article, I reproduce in full the relevant fiduciary duty provisions
from RUPA, ULPA (2001) and ULLCA. I also reproduce provisions from each of the Acts that
allow parties to opt out of the statutory fiduciary duties.
12 For a discussion of the ability and pecuniary incentive of managers to construct an
inefficient and unfair bargain with investors, see infra notes 50-5z, 57-59 and accompanying
text.
13 See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (describing the overly lax standard of
care), and notes 66-78 and accompanying text (describing the overly limited duty of loyalty).
14 See infra notes 53-65, 79-86 and accompanying text.
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ing principles." These abandoned principles are founded on consent and
provide, for example, that in the absence of third-party effects, parties-in
this case managers and investors-should be permitted to fashion their
own arrangements with one another and that the rules of society should
promote outcomes consistent with this idea.
Measured against the principles of actual or inferred consent, the fiduciary standards in the Acts fail to pass muster. It is difficult to imagine
that most investors, if fully informed, would consent to default standards of
care and loyalty as lax and limited as those contained in the Acts. It is even
more difficult to imagine that investors, if fully informed, would consent to
even lower standards that are permissible under the opt out provisions of
the Acts. In short, the fiduciary standards contained in the Acts promote
outcomes in which parties, who are less than fully informed, are saddled
with terms that are not fully priced.
There are explanations that one might offer for the lax, limited, and unduly pro-management fiduciary standards in the Acts. Bill Callison, for example, has suggested that the fiduciary standards coming from NCCUSL
sometimes evolve without any serious thought 6 and are compromised by
drafting hubris. 7 My own view, however, is that the failure of these uniform acts to establish appropriate fiduciary standards is better explained by
reference to public choice theory or a capture analysis.
Public choice theory 8 (also called interest group theory 9) offers an economic explanation for the extent to which interested groups are able to influence the outcome of legislative action. 0 The theory posits that a smaller,
cohesive interest group will have more influence on the outcome of legisla15 For a discussion of these principles, see infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
i6 J. William Callison, "The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend...": The Inadequacy of the
Gross Negligence Duty of Care Standardin UnincorporatedBusiness Organizations,94 Ky. L.J. 45 1,
452 (2oo5-o6).
17 Id. at 484.
18 Much has been written about public choice theory. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Phillip
Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 873-901 (1987); Jonathan R.
Macey,Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-33 (1986).
19 Macey, supra note 18, at 224, n.6.
20 See, e.g., William W. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciaryin an Interest
Group Perspective, I8 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975):
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government,
legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of
favorable legislation. The price that the winning group bids is determined both by the value of legislative protection to the group's members and the group's ability to overcome the free-rider problems that
plague coalitions. Payments take the form of campaign contributions,
votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes.
In short, legislation is "sold" by the legislature and "bought" by the beneficiaries of the legislation.
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tion than a competing larger, diffuse group, even though the larger group as
a whole may value the legislation more than the small group as a whole.
At first blush this theory seems problematic at best, since a group that
stands to gain the most in total seemingly could expend the most resources
to obtain their preferred legislative rule. Public choice theory, however,
explains this counterintuitive outcome by reference to the problems and
expense of collective action. It simply costs more to form and manage a
large group than it does a small group. Free rider problems"' also increase
with the size of the group. Members of large groups become more likely to
hang back, hoping others in the group will commit sufficient resources to
obtain the preferred outcome, enabling the non-participants to free ride on
the contributions and work of the participating members of the group.
These collective action problems can explain why it is nearly impossible for investors in unincorporated businesses to obtain, for example, their
preferred standard of care for managers in the uniform acts. The investors'
group would consist of all investors in all unincorporated businesses, which
is obviously a huge group. Concerted action by this group with regard to
rules promulgated by NCCUSL or adopted by state legislatures involves
overwhelming transaction costs and free rider problems."2
Managers of unincorporated business entities, while certainly amounting to a huge group, may have another way to achieve their preferred outcome with regard to fiduciary duties in uniform acts. Drafters of society's
rules may be captured by particular interest groups. In its mildest formand that is the limit of what I suggest here-this only means that drafters'
professional interests and life experiences cause rule-makers to align with
the preferences of managers. This alignment may result from the fact that
managers (as opposed to investors) are the most likely clients of the drafters. This may suggest that the most apparent basis for a bias may be economic interests, since rational drafters may conclude that they can enhance

See also,

MICHAEL

T. HAYES,

LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS:

A

THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS

69-70 (Rutgers University Press 1981) ("Members of the mass public will generally find it
irrational to obtain the information necessary to identify their interest on any given issue
and moreover will be ill-equipped to interpret any information they do obtain"); Farber &

Frickey, supra note 18, at 892; Macey, supra note 18, at 229-32.
21 See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 18, at 892 ("The 'free rider' problem suggests
that it should be nearly impossible to organize large groups of individuals to seek broadly
dispersed public goods. Instead, political activity should be dominated by small groups of
individuals seeking to benefit themselves, usually at the public expense").
22 To illuminate this point, assume, arguendo, that the standard of care preferred by investors as a group is negligence. Identifying all or even most of the group seems impossible,
and communication among those members that are identified is expensive. Members may
also individually not be willing to pay much to achieve a negligence standard. Finally each
member has an interest in hanging back, hoping that others will make the expenditures necessary to get the preferred standard, which will then allow them to free ride-to enjoy the
preferred result without expending any resources.
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their client base 3 by acting in ways that please managers. It may well be,
however, that the more effective capture is of the minds and hearts of drafters by non-economic means. My own experience suggests that the views
and biases of lawyers tend to drift toward those of the clients they serve
over time. It is hard for me to imagine that my representation of the interests of managers, which is the group I most represented in practice, did not
increase the probability that my views of what amounts to an appropriate
fiduciary standard would be bent toward the preferences of my clients.
Whatever may be the reason, the fiduciary duties in the uniform acts
for unincorporated business entities are substantially flawed by a pro-management bias. This article, therefore, makes the case for rethinking these
important duties and offers a number of first principles as bases from which
to revise the fiduciary duties respecting partnerships, limited partnerships,
and limited liability companies. The principles I offer are simple and generally uncontroversial. The principles illuminate the failure of the present
fiduciary standards in RUPA, ULPA (2001) and ULLCA and offer guidance toward better fiduciary duty rules that promote fair and efficient outcomes.
In Part I of this article, I articulate my first principles, which should be
the bases for fair and efficient fiduciary duty rules. In Part II, I use those
principles to demonstrate the failings of the fiduciary standards presently
found in the uniform acts and to support the revisions that I offer for those
fiduciary standards.
I.

FIRST PRINCIPLES

Fiduciary duties applicable to non-corporate business entities should promote fair and efficient outcomes and thus should be founded on principles
consistent with these worthy goals.
I offer the following first principles as bases from which to proceed to
such pleasing outcomes. The principles are simple, well-known and rest
comfortably on the morally and economically attractive notion of consent.
In short, these are principles over which there is wide agreement.
Perhaps most fundamental is the principle that managers and investors
in unincorporated entities, if they are able, ought to be permitted to shape
the terms of their arrangements between or among themselves, provided
that their arrangements do not generate material adverse third-party effects.2 4 The moral and economic right of parties, in the absence of third23 Academics on NCCUSL Committees may also be perceived as subject to similar bases for a pro-manager bias. Academics may continue to have private clients. Also, managers
(or entities they control) may make donations to academic institutions.
24 Third-party effects are also sometimes referred to as externalities. The term means
economic impact to some person not a party to the transaction. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (6th ed. 2003) (hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS)
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party effects, to pursue their own preferences is supported by their own
consent and thus can be traced to both Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism."5 Allowing parties to set their own terms is respectful of the
the
autonomy of rational beings (broadly, a Kantian notion) and promotes
6
maximization of overall utility or happiness (a utilitarian goal).,
It is difficult to identify any material third-party effects generated when
a manager of an unincorporated business entity and the entity's owners
agree on the terms of the manager's employment, including the nature and
extent of that manager's fiduciary duties.2 7
One might imagine, for example, a case in which a manager and the
owners of a partnership or an LLC are bargaining over the manager's duty
of care and whether the standard should be negligence or gross negligence.
Whichever of the standards is agreed upon by the parties, the choice affects
only the parties, and they are able to consent to and price the terms of their
arrangement. So, if the agreed-upon standard is negligence, the owners
get better service, but have to pay the manager a higher fee. If, instead,
the standard they agree to is gross negligence, the owners get somewhat
less careful management, but pay less for it. In either case, the parties have
consented and priced the outcomes, and neither choice seems in any way
materially to affect other persons. Whether the parties choose negligence
or, perhaps, opt instead for a gross negligence standard, it is a private decision between the parties without material third-party effects and thus
8
should be respected by society.
(defining externalities in the context of property law matters).
25 In Richard A. Posner, The Ethicaland PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980), Judge Posner offers a moral defense for the
pursuit of economic efficiency based essentially on the consent of the parties and thus argues
that pursuing economic efficiency "will produce an ethically attractive combination of happiness, of rights (to liberty and property), and of sharing with less fortunate members of society."
Id. at 487.
o

26 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 70-82 (199 ) (discussing and comparing Utilitarianism and Kantianism); see also, JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Macmillan 1970) (discussing the philosophy and writings of Kant). For
a more extensive discussion of Utilitarianism, see J.J.C. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM
(Cambridge University Press 1973) and H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 828 (1979). The foundations for utilitarianism are found in JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) and JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (E.P. Dutton and
Co., Inc. 1951) (1863).
27 See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, FiduciaryDuties and UnincorporatedBusiness Entities:
in Defense of the Manifestly UnreasonablyStandard,Univ. of Colo. Law Legal Studies Research
Paper No. o6-o6, at 3, availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sO13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=8932 13
("no third parties are adversely affected by their deal" (quoting J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of

Contract,FiduciaryDuties,andPartnerships:The BargainPrincipleandtheLaw ofAgency, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 439,443 (1997))).

28 Perhaps one might argue that a gross negligence standard has third-party effects,
since it increases the likelihood of the entity's failure, which then might harm non-owner
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In many situations, however, high transaction costs make it impossible
or inefficient for parties to bargain, and in such cases efficiency may be promoted by an appropriately crafted societal rule. Search costs, negotiation
costs, free rider problems, and bilateral monopolies are examples of factors
that may generate transaction costs when parties attempt to bargain with
one another.2 9 These transaction costs may in some cases exceed the value
created by the transaction, and, obviously in such instances the transaction,
although assumed to be efficient, will not occur.3° Even where the transaction will occur, a societal rule that mimics the arrangement that most of the
parties would select in most cases may promote efficiency by eliminating
the need of the parties to bargain and thereby reduce transaction costs. 1
The next principle, therefore, is that in instances where constructing
their own terms is inefficient or impossible for parties, society ought to enact broadly applicable rules consistent with those that the parties in most
circumstances would select, if they were able to bargain. This amounts to a
natural extension of the principle that parties, in the absence of third-party
effects, should be permitted to construct their own terms to govern their
private transactions.
constituencies, for example creditors. Not only is this a quite attenuated argument, but also it
is not at all clear creditors are actually harmed in any material way. Creditors can fully protect
themselves by contract and price. So, for example, a lender to an LLC with a gross negligence
standard, if it faces increased risk, can insist on protective covenants or a higher price for
its loan. In extending credit, of course, fully informed creditors always price the risk of the
economic failure of the entity to which they loan money. Banks, for example, demand more
interest for loans that have higher default risk.
29 A good example outside the business entity area is pollution. The parties impacted
by pollution are, on the one hand, the polluter, and, on the other, the many people adversely
impacted by the effects of the pollution. Bargaining between these parties is impossible
because it is functionally impossible for the polluter to identify and bargain with all the parties adversely impacted by pollution. Even if it were possible for the parties to identify each
other, each of the parties adversely affected by the pollution would be inclined not to bargain
with polluter in hopes that all the other adversely affected parties would arrive at a solution
with the polluter that is pleasing to the particular non-bargaining party, thus relieving him of
the costs and inconvenience of bargaining himself. For an excellent discussion of transaction costs (i.e., free rider problems, bilateral monopolies, etc.) in the context of pollution, see
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 60-62.
30 Consider the following simple example. Assume A has an antique table that he values at $io,ooo and that B values at $i i,ooo. If transaction costs (perhaps the costs of hiring
a lawyer to negotiate the transaction and draft a contract governing the terms of the sale)
amount to $i,ioo, the sale will not occur, even though B values the table more than A. See
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs, supra note 24, at 61 ("If transactions costs are ... higher than
the value of the transaction ... they won't be incurred; the parties will be better off foregoing
the transaction").
31 Assume that ten sets of parties would engage in a particular transaction and that without a societal rule governing the terms of the transaction, transaction costs would amount to
$1o per transaction, or $Ioo total. If society can enact a rule that approximates the terms the
parties would select, parties will no longer have to expend $io on each transaction, arriving at
efficient outcomes with fewer expenditures.
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These principles suggest strongly that society should enact fiduciary
duty rules governing unincorporated entities and that those duties should
amount to those that most parties in most situations would agree upon. If,
for example, most managers and investors in most unincorporated business entities would agree on a negligence standard of care for managers, a
broadly applicable societal rule establishing negligence as the standard of
care enhances the probability of efficiency in cases where transaction costs
are so high as to prevent bargaining. Even in cases where bargaining over
fiduciary standards is possible, a rule that mimics the preferences of the
parties in most cases enhances efficiency by relieving those parties of the
need to bargain.
Another principle, which should be apparent from the prior discussion,
is that, ideally, society's rules respecting fiduciary duties in unincorporated
entities should be default rules. Default rules preserve the ability of parties to reach efficient outcomes in instances in which society's generally
efficient arrangements do not satisfy the particular parties' preferences.
Default rules, therefore, are properly viewed as ameliorating the probability of inefficient outcomes resulting from society's rules.
Certain conditions must exist for society's default rules to work at their
best. First, society's default rule itself must be intelligible. Obviously, in
order to choose between accepting society's default rule or remaking the
default rule, a party must understand the default rule. Without an understanding of society's rule, true consent is impossible, and a party may, for
example, eschew exercising the right to construct a new rule that suits her
preference because she, mistakenly, believes that the default rule meets
her preferences.3"
Next, the process for remaking, or opting out of, the default rules
should be inexpensive. If, for example, society mandates an elaborate opt
out process that costs the parties 10 to exercise and the parties' total gain
from remaking the inefficient default rule is only 8, the parties will accept
society's inefficient default rule.33
The last condition necessary for opt out provisions to achieve maximum efficiency is that the parties must be fully informed. If asymmetry
32 Assume, for example, that the statutory default standard of care for a manager of an
unincorporated business entity is actually gross negligence, but that the statute defines the
standard of care in a manner that leads an investor to believe the standard is negligence. If
an investor preferring negligence accedes to the default standard, the outcome may be inefficient, since it may be likely that if the investor were fully informed (i.e., understood the actual
default standard), the parties would have opted out of the default standard, and the agreement
between the investor and the manager would have been struck at negligence.

Unintelligible standards may also generate high transaction costs as the parties, likely
with help from lawyers, attempt to sort out the meaning of the default standard. Later, managers will have more uncertainty about the propriety of their actions, again generating unnecessary costs as they attempt to meet the requirements of unclear rules.

33 This is the same point made previously. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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of information about the terms of the opt out provision enables one party
to fool the other regarding the actual terms of the remade arrangement,
the remade arrangement may not be efficient. It may not be the term that
would have been agreed upon, if both parties had been fully informed.
This, of course, is the flip side of the point made above, which was that
consent regarding opting out requires an understanding of the default rule.
Here the point is that consent also requires an understanding of the remade rule as well. In short, consent and thus fairness and efficiency require
parties to be fully informed.
This, then, leads to the final of my first principles. If most parties opt
out of a societal rule that for them is efficient and into a remade rule that
for them is inefficient, society's rule should be mandatory.
While this statement may at first seem silly, since an efficient rule for
the parties is one that they prefer and it is therefore difficult to imagine why
such parties would abandon the preferred rule, it relates back to the point
made immediately above regarding asymmetry of information. Assume
that society rules impose a 6 month warranty of merchantability on all
washing machines and that reflects the arrangement that would be agreed
upon by the parties in 98% of all washing machine sales. If the warranty is
a default rule, however, manufacturers may be able to price their washing
machines as if the warranty were in place, while opting out of the warranty.
This could be accomplished by burying the opt out term in a purchase
contract, which, one might assume, involves consumers who will be unable
or unwilling to plow through the fine print. The result of an unfettered opt
out right in such a case, therefore, is an outcome that is both inefficient and
unfair. It is inefficient since it is not the agreement that the large majority
of the parties would agree to, if they were fully informed. It is unfair because consumers are paying for the warranty but not receiving it.
These facts suggest that a mandatory rule imposing the warranty of
merchantability is appropriate in this situation. Although under the mandatory rule, 2% of all transactions would involve an inefficient outcome,
98% would involve an efficient outcome. Professor Richard Booth' and

34 Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary Duty Contract and Waiver in Partnerships and Limited
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 55, 64 (1997). Although clearly favoring
LLC fiduciary rules that permit generous opting out, Professor Booth defends the limitations
ULLCA imposes on the complete opting out of fiduciary duties. He concludes that permitting parties an unlimited right to opt out of the ULLCA's fiduciary standards "is too easy."
Id. "A statute that allows for total waiver would likely undercut serious bargaining between
It would allow the more informed party simply to insist on a total waiver
the parties ....
without specifying the nature of the conflict expected." Id. at 6. His position seems firmly
rooted in the idea that sound economic theory requires mandatory terms when it is likely that
sharp operators will exploit strategic and informational advantages in ways that permit them
to construct inefficient trades in most cases. An efficient societal mandatory rule is the best
solution in that case.

Liability Companies, I J.
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Professor Mark Loewenstein 3 have persuasively argued similar points in
connection with a defense of a mandatory core of fiduciary duties in unincorporated associations.
This analysis becomes specifically relevant later in this paper when we
evaluate the statutory opt out provisions in the ULLCA, RUPA and ULPA
(2001), since managers of unincorporated business entities, similar to the
above example involving manufacturers of washing machines, often have
both the incentive and opportunity to exploit information asymmetries in
36

opting out.

The principles articulated in this portion of the paper generate little
theoretical controversy or disagreement, due in large part to the fact that
the principles are based on the morally attractive notion of consent. If two
parties knowingly enter into a transaction that has no adverse effects on any
other person, it is quite difficult to raise any moral objection to the transaction. The benefit of the transaction to the parties is proven by their consent
and the absence of harm to anyone else offers strong moral support for allowing the transaction to go forward. Even the most vigorous advocates of
competing positions 37 seem in agreement on this fundamental point.38
The disagreement between contractarians and fiduciarians or liberals
and conservatives is largely about the facts. Thus, for example, while near35 Loewenstein, supra note 27, at 28 ("the relevant operating or partnership agreement
may be very long and complex. Terms that relate to fiduciary duties may not be collected
in one section; instead, terms ... may appear in various sections dealing with management,
distributions, repurchase of units, etc."). Later he says: "the investor may not, in fact, be fully
Id. at 29.
informed or sufficiently sophisticated .
36 See infra notes 57-65, 83-86 and accompanying text.
37 Dean Allan Vestal and Professor Larry Ribstein are two of the most forceful and
persuasive advocates of the competing positions that may be referred to, respectively, as fiduciarians and contractarians. Compare the fiduciarian views expressed in Allan W. Vestal,
FundamentalContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV.
523, 524 (1993) ("I conclude that the contractarian error is so basic to the Revised [Uniform
Partnership] Act, and the deleterious effects of the error are so profound, that the Conference
should withdraw the Revised Act, rework it to conform to the fiduciary world view, and only
then repromulgate it and recommend its adoption by the states"), with the contractarian views
in Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Readyfor Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW.
45, 52 0993) (using contractarian arguments to criticize the fiduciary duty rules of RUPA as
"seriously misguided").
38 Consider, for example, an article written during the debate over the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act. Dean Vestal describes the fiduciarian approach as one in which partners
"are free to pursue their individual self-interest at the expense of the collective only in situations where either the partners clearly understand ex ante that the collective interest might
be subordinated, or where the partner... obtains the informed consent of the other partners to do
so." Vestal supra note 37, at 524 (emphasis added). Dean Vestal articulates the contractarian
view as one in which, "partners always are free to advance their own self-interest [through
contract] ... unless they specifically agree to the contrary." Id. at 523-24 (emphasis added). The

quote from Dean Vestal's article accurately suggests that both sides in the debate appreciate
the importance of consent and the moral attractiveness of society's permitting parties to shape
their own fiduciary duties.
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ly everyone would agree with the principle that society's fiduciary duty rule
should be the rule that most parties would agree upon, there likely will be
a spirited debate about the factual matter of what rule the parties would
choose. Regarding the matter of the standard of care imposed on managers
of unincorporated business entities, for example, contractarians may argue
that if investors and managers were able to bargain, most bargains would be
struck around a very lax standard, perhaps limiting managers fiduciary duty
of care only to forbid managerial acts that amount to intentional misconduct. Fiduciarians, on the other hand, may imagine that the facts are entirely different and thus argue that parties would undoubtedly agree upon
a tough standard of care, such as negligence.39
Factual disagreements may also arise around the last of my first principles, where contractarians may argue against the imposition of any mandatory limitation on the right of parties to fashion the terms of their agreement. They may base this argument on their factual reckoning that the
risk of exploitation of informational asymmetries is low or non-existent,
and thus the parties are in such cases fully able to protect themselves by
contract. Fiduciarians, on the other hand, may see the facts as involving

pervasive and significant informational asymmetries that are exploited by
managers at the expense of investors in nearly all cases.
It is helpful to realize that the essence of the disagreement over the appropriate shape of fiduciary duties is more about the facts than about prin-

39 Fiduciarians and contractarians may have views of the facts in particular instances and
indeed of the world that seem vastly different. A vivid example of this can be found in an
earlier debate over the employment at will doctrine. An employment at will is an arrangement
which can be terminated without cause by either the employer or the employee. On what I
would consider the contractarian side of the debate, Richard Epstein argued in favor of the
employment at will doctrine as being efficient. Part of his argument was based on his factual
assumption that workers are fully able to take care of themselves by shaping contracts that
would meet their preferences with regard to job protection. In Epstein's view, "we are dealing with the routine stuff of ordinary life; people who are competent enough to marry; vote,
and pray are not unable to protect themselves in their day-to-day business transactions." He
found no "reason to believe that [employment] ... contracts are marred by misapprehensions,
since employers and employees know the footing on which they have contracted." Richard
Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947,954-55 (1984).
Representing what I would characterize as the fiduciarian side of the debate, Professor
Clyde Summers had an extremely different view of the facts in regard to employment at will
contracts. Summers' research enabled him to conclude that in "tens of thousands of [employee] discipline cases.... nearly half [involved] ... instances of injustice." Clyde Summers,
IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Timefora Statute, 6z VA. L. REv. 481, 532 (1976).
He was also convinced by research that showed more than half of all discharge cases resulted
in reinstatement of the dismissed employee. Id.
These views, of course, are based on dramatically different assessments of the facts.
Epstein is of the opinion that workers can and do work out suitable terms. Summers takes
the opposing position regarding workers' ability to protect themselves against overreaching
by employers.
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ciples. This recognition sharpens and focuses the debate. It forces those of
us who are engaged in the polemic over the appropriate nature of fiduciary
duties to articulate and defend factual assumptions that underlie our rules.
It also may encourage empirical work that can shed light on the real facts
and thus lead society into rules that are more efficient and fair.
II.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE STATUTES

RUPA, ULLCA and ULPA (2001) all adopt the same construct of dividing
fiduciary duties into the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, articulating
standards for both loyalty and care obligations, and permitting the parties
to a significant degree-but not entirely-to opt out of the statutory standards for duty of care and duty of loyalty. The three statutes also contain
essentially the same substantive standards for duty of care and duty of loy40

alty.

Measured against the principles described in Part I of this paper, the
fiduciary duty rules in these uniform acts are badly flawed and thus likely
to lead to unfair and inefficient outcomes.
A. Duty of Care
1. The Standard.-RUPA,ULLCA and ULPA (2001) all opt for a gross negligence standard of care. 41 A gross negligence standard amounts to a significantly more relaxed standard of care than a negligence standard. Under
a negligence standard, managers would breach their duty by a failure to
use reasonable care. 4 Under the more relaxed gross negligence standard
adopted by the three uniform acts, however, managers breach their duty of
care only if their actions are so stupid and 43careless as to amount to a gross
or extreme deviation from reasonable care.
40 The fiduciary duty sections and the opt-out sections from each of the three uniform
acts are reproduced in APPENDIX A infra.
41 SeeAPPENDiXA infra. Not all states adopting the uniform acts have accepted the gross

negligence standard of care. In 2oo6, Kentucky, for example, adopted both RUPA and ULPA
(zoo) and in both cases chose to incorporate a negligence standard of care in lieu of the
Uniform Acts' gross negligence standard. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362. 1-404(3) (West 2007)
(partnership duty of care); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.2-408(3) (West 2007) (limited partnership

duty of care).
42 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1963) ("negligence is conduct which

falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm").
43 Although there is less than unanimity about the definition of gross negligence, gross
negligence always involves a significant deviation from a standard of reasonable care. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 200 1) (requiring negligence that is "especially bad"); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 34, at 211 12 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) ("very great negligence"). An

example I often use with my class is as follows: In a 35 mile per hour zone, it is negligence to
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Gross negligence as a standard of care lacks quantitative precision.
Because it is a standard articulated in general terms, its applicability in some
cases will be uncertain. This inherent ambiguity is troubling to some.'
This marginal vagueness, however, is not the most troubling aspect of
the gross negligence standard of care found in the uniform acts. 4 The
much more serious problem is that gross negligence amounts to the wrong
standard. It promotes outcomes that are inefficient and unfair.'
If one returns to the principles in Part I of this paper, 47 a gross negligence standard is inconsistent with the principle that society's default rule
should be the rule that most parties in most cases would select: It seems
highly unlikely that fully informed owners and managers of unincorporated
business entities would in most cases select gross negligence as a standard
of care, since such a lax standard provides no incentive for managers to act
reasonably. Indeed, a gross negligence standard actually generates an incentive on the part of managers to act unreasonably or negligently with regard to their obligations to owners. One can assume that it takes more time
and energy for a manager to act reasonably than it does for the manager
merely to refrain from acting extremely unreasonably. Logically, therefore,
one may see managers as sacrificing their valued leisure time in order to
move the quality of their management from the not-extremely unreasonable standard (gross negligence) to the not-unreasonable standard (neglidrive 38 miles per hour and gross negligence to drive 60.
44 See, e.g., William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and NeutralPrinciples, io
DEL. J. CORP. L. 465,497-98 (1985) ("The concept of'gross negligence' has been expressly rejected by the better tort scholarship as practically meaningless. Therefore its recent adoption
in corporate law would appear, in some respects, to be an analytical step backwards").
45 Standards of care designed for broad application must often, out of necessity, be articulated in a general fashion. Consider, for example, an obligation imposed by tort law to
operate an automobile in a reasonable fashion. While such a rule may be somewhat vague
around the margin, it is impractical (impossible?) for society to enact the literally thousands of
small rules that are captured by the reasonableness rule (e.g., driving speed in rain, in one inch
of snow, when crowds appear along the side of the road, etc.; the obligation to set a parking
brake on a flat grade, on a 2% incline, when pedestrians are present or when no pedestrians
are present but valuable property is present). The economic cost of vagueness may be offset
by the savings in not enacting, enforcing, etc. many rules.
46 In Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership
Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 464-69 (i99i), Dean Weidner provides both an interesting historical
perspective on partners' standard of care and an explication of the debate and arguments that
occurred in connection with the adoption of RUPAs standard of care. The strongest-but
yet unconvincing-argument recounted by Dean Weidner in favor of a lax, gross negligence
standard of care is an insurance-based argument. If, as the argument goes, all partners are
equally engaged in the management of the partnership and thus equally likely to harm the
interests of the partnership by their negligent act, the partners rationally would agree not to be
individually liable for negligence, but would instead agree to share negligence induced losses
among the partners as a group. In such cases, sharing the negligence losses by opting into a
gross negligence standard of care becomes a form of self-insurance. Id. at 468.
47 See supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
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gence). It is hard to imagine that most investors would be willing to accept
an investment that offers managers such incentives for poor management.
Imagine, for example, a situation in which managers, putting together
a deal, tell investors that they, as managers, are not required to pursue the
best interests of the owners with a reasonable level of care and skill but
that, instead, they are permitted-actually, even encouraged by the structure of their incentives-to act unreasonably. It is hard to believe that most
investors would make such an investment. It seems much more likely that
investors would in such a case search for an alternate investment that had
a more favorable management contract and would be willing to pay the
additional management costs necessary to promote a reasonable level of
care and skill in the management of their investment. In the competitive
capital and management markets, I find it nearly impossible to imagine
that investors and managers, assuming full information and the ability to
bargain with one another, would in most cases opt into a gross negligence
standard of care.
I admit, indeed I emphasize, that my disagreement with the uniform
statute drafters about the appropriate standard of care is based on a disagreement about the facts and not about principle. As stated in Part I of
this paper, no one seems to question that owners and managers of unincorporated entities should be able to pick their own standard of care and that
society's default rule should be the rule that most would pick in most situations.4" The disagreement here is about the facts.49 Which standard of care,
negligence or gross negligence, is the efficient and fair standard? Which
standard would most parties in most cases agree upon? For the reasons
articulated above, my firm view of the facts based on my own preferences
and my experiences as a lawyer and in business is that, if fully informed
and able to bargain, parties in most cases would settle upon a negligence
standard of care.
Even if there is some uncertainty about my factual assumption that in
most cases the parties would agree on a negligence standard of care, doubts
about this should be resolved in favor of the higher standard. This is because the higher standard promotes more fully informed bargaining. 0

48 See supranotes 24-33 and accompanying text.
49 See supranotes 37-39 and accompanying text.

50 The argument I make here is similar to the argument that scholars have made against
always using majoritarian default rules. Majoritarian rules are those that most parties would
select in most cases. In some instances, however, a non-majoritarian default rule may promote
efficient outcomes by improving the quality of information, as one party attempts to bargain
its way out of the default rule and is thus induced to share more information with the other
party in order to convince the other party to agree to opt out of the default rule. See, e.g., Ian
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1391, 1397-98 (1992) (using as an example a default rule that permits piercing the
corporate veil for undisclosed undercapitalization).
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A statutory default standard of care becomes a part of the contract between the owner and the manager without the terms of the rule being
physically included in the written partnership or LLC operating agreement. This incorporation without express reference increases the likelihood that investors in unincorporated business entities will misunderstand
the nature of the fiduciary duty of care owed to them by their manager.
The risk is that investors may mistakenly assume and pay for a higher standard of care than gross negligence."1
Managers of unincorporated business entities operate from the superior
side of informational asymmetry. They normally control the entity documents and have ready access to the entity's lawyer, who can explain and
counsel the managers regarding the terms of the entity agreement and is
most likely willing to fashion documents that suit the preferences of the
managers. Investors, on the other hand, typically enjoy no such advantages.
Bargaining between the parties is enhanced by setting a higher standard of care and thus requiring the managers who wish to opt into a lower
standard of care to include the reduced standard of care in the actual partnership or LLC operating agreement. It increases, at least to some degree,
the probability that investors are fully informed about the actual standard
of care, since it will be in the document they sign and, hopefully, read and
understand."
In summary, efficiency and fairness are promoted by a negligence standard as opposed to a gross negligence standard of care. Negligence, at least
in my view of the facts, amounts to the more efficient standard. It is the
standard that parties would agree upon in most cases, if they were fully
informed. A negligence standard also reduces the problem of asymmetry
51 In Ian Ayres, YA-HUH: There Are andShouldBe Penalty Defaults,33

FLA. ST. L.

REV. 589

(2006), Professor Ayres defends the use of non-majoritarian default rules (i.e., default rules

that are not the rules that most parties would select) in instances where there is asymmetrical
information about legal rights, which is what I argue in the case of fiduciary duties applicable
to managers of unincorporated entities. "The 'legal information-forcing' rules are most plausible when there is asymmetric information about the content of the law itself. In the face of
asymmetric legal information, a straightforward solution is to set the default against the more
knowledgeable party." Id. at 59752 My argument here is not that the more rigorous standard of care will remedy all information asymmetry between managers and investors in unincorporated business entities.
Managers would still have available, for example, the tactic of facilitating investor ignorance
by burying a reconstituted standard of care deep in a long and complex partnership or LLC
operating agreement. Nonetheless, if we force managers to communicate the standard of care
it moves toward full disclosure between the parties. Also, as I suggest later, the uniform acts
should be amended to require that any opt out of the duty of care must be disclosed prominently in writing on the outside front cover page of the partnership or LLC operating agreement. My view is that these two provisions together-enhancing the standard and requiring
prominent disclosure of any opt out-would generate an improvement in fully informed bargaining by the parties. See infra notes 57-58, 6o-6i and accompanying text.
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of information between managers and investors in unincorporated business
entities by requiring that any reduction in that standard be agreed upon by
the parties.
2. Opting Out of the Duty of Carr.-ULLCA, RUPA and ULPA (2001) all
have similar provisions permitting the parties to opt out of the statutory,
gross negligence standard of care. All of the Acts require that the opt out
provision be in the partnership or LLC operating agreement and that the
reconstituted standard for the duty of care not unreasonably reduce the
statutory gross negligence standard. 3
In discussing the principles in Part I of this paper, I offered the familiar
argument that opt out provisions tend to promote fairness and efficiency.
In instances where there are no material third-party effects, permitting
parties to refashion a default rule to suit their own preferences generally
facilitates the creation of economic value.
The prior discussion emphasized, however, that to achieve their maximum fairness and efficiency, opt out provisions must be inexpensive to
4
access, and parties exercising the right to opt out must be fully informed.1
If the expense of opting out exceeds the economic value created by opting
out, parties will not exercise the right to opt out but will, instead, accept an
inefficient default rule. If parties offered the right to opt out are less than
fully informed, they may accept an inefficient default rule or agree to an
inefficient reconstituted rule. s
Under the uniform acts, the statutory provisions applicable to opting out
of the default standard of care are, as a procedural matter, simple and thus
inexpensive to access. The only requirement is that any opt out arrangement be included in the partnership or operating agreement. Normally,
one would imagine that the agreement would be in writing, 6 and includ53 SeeAPPENDIX A infra.
54 Seesupra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of opt out provisions and
conditions for maximum efficiencies from such provisions.
55 Some recent interesting empirical work conducted by Professor Listokin supports
this economic theory. His work demonstrates that default rules impact outcome. Professor
Listokin examined the extent to which corporations adopt certain anti-takeover rules. As a
part of this, he compared states that enacted Fair Price statutes as default rules with states
that had no Fair Price statutes. He found: "Only 20% of companies incorporated in states
without 'Fair Price' statutes choose to write fair price protection into their corporate charters
.... Almost all companies (more than 96%) in states where fair price protection is the default
rule have fair price protection." Yair Listokin, What Do CorporateDefault Rules andMenus Do?
An EmpiricalExamination, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 335, at 6, availableat
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=924578. Assuming that an efficient level of use of fair price
statutes would be roughly the same from state to state, the data suggest an inefficient level of
use of fair price provisions in one or both of the groups of states.
56 It is permissible for partnership and LLC operating agreements to be oral. See, e.g.,
RUPA § 101(7) (2oo7) (defining a partnership agreement as an "agreement, whether written,
oral or implied.
). Normally, however, those agreements are likely to be written. Even if
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ing an additional provision dealing with the reconstituted standard of care
should not be too expensive.
The real problem in achieving efficiency through opting out of the standard of care, however, is the lack of full information. It seems likely that
in many cases one side of the opt out bargain-specifically, investors-may
be less than fully informed at the point when the opt out decision occurs.
Managers have both the opportunity and the incentive to exploit this information asymmetry.
While information asymmetry between managers and investors about
the standard of care is ameliorated to some extent by the procedural requirement that the opt out terms be included in the partnership or LLC
operating agreement, there remains a significant and persistent opportunity
for managers to exploit their information advantages through reconstituted
bargains respecting the duty of care. As described above,57 managers control the construction of the essential entity documents, 8 which puts them
on the advantageous side of the informational asymmetry and enables
them to generate entity documents that suit their preferences. On the investors side of the opt out bargain, on the other hand, it seems unlikely that
a remade and relaxed standard of care on page twenty-two of a forty page,
single-spaced partnership agreement or LLC operating agreement would
be understood by most investors.5 9
Managers may have a pecuniary incentive to exploit this information
asymmetry through opting into a very low standard of care. Simply stated,
managers may have a preference to be paid at a high level commensurate
with a strong duty of care standard while actually being subject to a lax
standard of care. Their strategic informational advantages permit them to
accomplish this and thus exploit what is an inefficient and unfair bargain
with their investors.
One step that might reduce this asymmetry of information between
managers and investors is based on an approach taken by the Securities
and Exchange Commission with regard to disclosure of risk factors in a
oral, any parry wishing to secure an opt out from the default loyalty rules would seem to have
an interest in a written record of any opt out terms and proof that the investors had agreed to
those terms.
57 Seesupra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
58 In my own practice experience, in which I dealt with many unincorporated business
entities, inevitably, the person who established the terms of the arrangement was the one
who performed management functions for the business. It was, as an illustration, the general
partner in limited partnerships and the managing partner in general partnerships who came to
my office to have the partnership agreement crafted.
59 Loewenstein, supra note 27, at z8. "IT]he relevant operating or partnership agreement may be very long and complex. Terms that relate to fiduciary duties may not be collected in one section; instead, terms ... may appear in various sections dealing with management, distributions, repurchase of units, etc." Id. Later he says: "the investor may not, in fact,
be fully informed or sufficiently sophisticated .
Id. at 29.
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registration statement. For years the Commission, consistent with its disclosure mandate, has required or encouraged issuers prominently to display
or reference. critical information, such as risk factors, in bold type on the
outside front cover page of the prospectus. 6° In economic terms, the SEC
is attempting to ensure that unique and significant risks are understood and
priced by the trading parties, in that case the issuer and the investors in the
public offering.
Applying this general approach to duty of care opt out provisions makes
perfect sense. It is a way to increase the probability that investors involved
in opting out of the default standard of care are more fully informed.
An effective opt out, therefore, should depend not only on the inclusion
of the opt out terms in the partnership or LLC operating agreement but
also on. the disclosure of the opt out on the outside front cover page of the
partnership or LLC operating agreement. At a minimum, that disclosure
should prominently, concisely and in plain English describe and explain
the statutory default standard of care and the reconstituted standard of care
and, if necessary, cross-reference more detailed opt out provisions elsewhere in the agreement.61

60 Item i of Registration Form S-3, 2 CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter 117151, for
example, incorporates by reference Item 501 of Regulation SK. 17 C.ER. § 229.501 (2oo6), 7

CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter ' 71,051. Item 5oi(b)(5) requires the issuer to state
on the "outside front cover page of the prospectus . . . [a] cross-reference to the risk factors section . . [and to] [hlighlight this cross-reference by prominent type or in another manner." Instructions regarding the content of the risk factors section are found in Item 503(c)
of Regulation SK. 17 C.FR. § 229.503(c) (2oo6), 7 CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter '
71,053.

61 Language in the uniform acts permitting the opt out of the duty of care might include
the following:
Any change in the statutory standard of care shall be prominently,
concisely and in plain English explained and disclosed on the first page
of the [partnership/operating] agreement. In the event the [partnership/
operating] agreement is not in writing, each [partner/member] prior to
becoming a [partner/member] shall be supplied with a concise and
clear written explanation and disclosure of any change in the statutory
standard of care, and thereafter any subsequent change in the standard
of care shall be preceded by a prominent, concise and plain English
explanation and disclosure of the proposed change in the standard of
care.

The proposal does not provide specific language necessary to meet the prominently, concisely
and in plain English criteria. This should be left to the parties, along with the residual risk
that the default standard will be applicable, if they fail to meet the three criteria designed to
promote full information. While this will increase transaction costs somewhat-principally
due to the residual risk if the promoting party gets it wrong-fiduciaries, who likely will be
controlling the construction of the documents, will have a strong self interest in constructing a
disclosure that meets the rigorous criteria and thus promotes full disclosure.
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A more dramatic and factually problematic prescription for inefficient
opt outs is to impose a more restrictive limit on the right to opt out of
the statutory duty of care. The present floor on the right to opt out of the
statutory standard of care is that the remade standard cannot unreasonably
reduce the statutory, gross negligence standard. My view is that raising
this mandatory floor, if properly tailored, would enhance efficient and fair
outcomes.
The theoretical underpinning for my argument in favor of a higher
mandatory floor on the duty of care was described in Part II of this paper.
Limiting the right to opt out makes economic sense in situations where
parties, operating under unrestricted opt out rights, tend to opt out of more
efficient rules into less efficient rules. If, on balance, the losses from parties
opting into less efficient standards exceed the gains from parties' opting
into more efficient standards, overall efficiency is enhanced by restricting
the right to opt out.6" It is this analysis that justifies expanding the mandatory scope of the statutory duty of care by further limiting the right to opt
out of the duty of care under the ULLCA, RUPA and ULPA (2001).
In estimating the efficient floor or limitation on the right to opt out of
the duty of care, I start from the assumption, previously stated, that the efficient standard of care is a negligence standard, which obligates managers
to act reasonably.63 My judgment is that in most cases fully informed parties in unincorporated business entities would agree that managers should
act reasonably and that, accordingly, managers violate their fiduciary duties by acting unreasonably or negligently. 64 My further factual reckoning
is, however, that in some instances this negligence standard of care may
not amount to a standard particular parties prefer. Some managers may be
reluctant, without a significant increase in management fees, to accept that
tough negligence standard, and some investors may be unwilling to pay
the price that managers demand for the higher standard. In short, there
seems to be significant efficiency gains in permitting parties by agreement
to reduce the statutory negligence standard to a gross negligence standard.
Under a gross negligence standard, managers would not breach their fiduciary duties by acts that are merely negligence but, instead, would breach
their duty of care only if their actions were so unreasonable as to amount to
an extreme deviation from reasonable care.
It is hard for me, however, to find net gains in efficiency by allowing
parties to drop below a gross negligence standard and thus, for example,
agree to predicate managerial liability on a "bad faith" standard or an "intentional acts of misconduct" standard. These very lax standards of care
would permit managers with impunity to engage in conduct that is so stu-

62 See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.

63 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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pid or unreasonable that it amounts to an extreme deviation from reasonable care, and this is the bargain that I find highly improbable. Only in the
rarest of cases can I imagine that the parties knowingly would agree to such
an extremely lax standard of care.
My factual reckoning, therefore, is that the loss of efficiency in denying parties the right to opt into a standard more lax than gross negligence
65
is slight.
On the other hand, denying parties the right to opt into an extremely
lax "bad faith" or "intentional acts of misconduct standard" may enhance
efficiency by curbing managers' exploitation of asymmetrical information.
The economic incentive and opportunity of managers to construct an opt
out into such extremely lax standards without the full knowledge of investors represents a significant threat to efficiency. Preventing such activity
represents a significant gain in efficiency.
My view, therefore, is that net gains in efficiency are achieved by setting the opt out floor at a gross negligence standard. The economic costs
in denying parties the right to opt into extremely relaxed standards of care
seem immaterial, while the economic gains appear significant.
Opt out provisions are an integral part of efficient duty of care rules.
The opt out provisions in the Acts fail to promote fair and efficient outcomes, however, principally because they facilitate managers' construction
of opt outs that are based on less than full information. Managers have
both the tactical advantage and the pecuniary incentive to exploit their
informational advantages. Efficient and fair outcomes would be promoted
by requiring opt outs to be disclosed on the outside front cover page of the
partnership or LLC operating agreement and by limiting duty of care opt
outs to gross negligence.
B. Duty of Loyalty
1. The Standard.-The statutory duty of loyalty is essentially the same under the ULLCA, RUPA and ULPA(2001). 6 Fiduciaries operating under
those statutes violate their duty of loyalty in four instances. 67 These involve
situations in which fiduciaries: (1) profit or derive benefit as a result of the
65 Approaching this matter in a non-economic manner, one may also have difficulty in
finding any public policy that is furthered by permitting and encouraging managers to operate in such a highly careless way. Economists, however, especially those attracted to Kantian
moral theory, would argue that any limitation on the right of rational humans to exercise their
autonomy should be respected, even if their preferences are outside the mainstream. For a
discussion of the application of Kantian moral theory to economics, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 70-82 (rev. ed. 199o).
66 See APPENDIX A infra, for duty of loyalty provisions from RUPA, ULLCA and ULPA
(2001).

67 As a matter of structure, the loyalty sections in all three of the uniform acts are broken
into only three subsections. See, e.g., Section 404(b) of RUPA in APPENDIX A infra.
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conduct of the entity's business; 68 (2) usurp an entity opportunity; (3) deal
with the entity while having an interest adverse to the entity; or (4) compete with the entity.
All of the Acts make these four matters the exclusive duties of loyalty
for the managers of the entities. Subsections (a) of the statutes describe
the express statutory duties as the "only fiduciary duties" that the managers owe to the entities and the owners.6 9 For good measure, the specific
duties of loyalty subsection in each of the statutes states that the duty of
loyalty "is limited to" those four specific aspects of loyalty.7"
The loyalty standards in ULLCA, RUPA and ULPA (2001) can lead
to inappropriate outcomes, principally because of the exclusivity of the
four specific loyalty rules.71 Compared to such an exclusivity approach, a
broadly articulated duty of loyalty better promotes fair and efficient outcomes by providing stronger deterrence against managerial self dealing and
promoting more informed bargaining. A broadly articulated standard of
loyalty also allows courts to offer remedies in response to evolving forms of
self-interested managerial misconduct.
The common law jurisprudence of Delaware corporate law captures in
the intrinsic fairness standard what amounts to an efficient duty of loyalty rule, both in terms of the substance of the rule and the generality or
breadth of its articulation. Substantively, the core of Delaware's approach
to the loyalty obligation of corporate fiduciaries is the sensible and efficient principle that managers owe a higher fiduciary duty to shareholders
when managers' actions are conflicted. This seems likely to approximate
the agreement that fully informed investors and managers would construct
for themselves, if they were able to bargain over the matter, and thus is
similar to the duty courts have fashioned to apply to other fiduciaries and
their beneficiaries. Trustees, for example, are similarly subjected to higher
fiduciary standards when they engage in conflicted transactions on behalf
of their trusts.7

68 Interestingly, this provision is copied from the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 §
zi(l) [hereinafter UPA] (requiring a partner to "account to the partnership" for any "profits
derived by him without the consent of the other partners" in connection with the "conduct"
of the partnership) and is in all three of the uniform acts. See APPENDIx A infra.
69 See, e.g., RUPA Section 404(a) in APPENDIX A infra.
70 See, e.g.,
RUPA Section 404(b) in APPENDIX A infra.
71 Perhaps as much as any other aspect of the fiduciary duty rules in the uniform acts,
the exclusivity of the four loyalty rules supports a public choice or capture explanation for
the failure to enact efficient standards. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. This
strongly pro-management approach to the duty of loyalty with its increased probability of
managers' exploitation of informational asymmetries is difficult to explain other than as reflecting the undue influence of managers' preferences for inefficient bargains respecting the
duty of loyalty.
72 "As long as [a trustee] ... is not acting in his own interest the standard fixed for his
behavior is only that of a reasonable degree of care, skill, and caution. But when the trustee
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Weinbergerv. UOP,Inc.73 is the best known application of this basic loyalty rule to conflicted corporate fiduciaries. In Weinberger the court held that
the burden was on conflicted directors to demonstrate that their actions in
facilitating a freezeout of minority shareholders were entirely fair to those
minority shareholders.7 4 This intrinsic fairness standard amounts to an enhanced substantive standard---entire fairness instead of the business judgment standard of gross negligenceT7S-and a procedural shift that assigns
the burden of proof to the defendant.
Not only is an enhanced, intrinsic fairness standard itself efficient, but
Delaware's broad formulation of the standard, as opposed to the four discrete and exclusive rules of the ULLCA, RUPA and ULPA (2001), promotes fairness and efficiency as well. It seems unlikely that the owners of
the entities, had they thought about it, would have agreed to cabin fiduciary duties in four rather specific rules.
Business transactions and, unfortunately, managerial misconduct are in
a perpetual state of evolution. As a result, investors in unincorporated business entitles are not well served by any attempt to cabin the duty of loyalty
within four specific rules. 76 Specific, exclusive rules invite managers to construct transactions that evade the spirit and underlying purpose of those
rules and as a result visit unfair and unbargained for results on the beneficiaries of managers' fiduciary duties. 77 It seems safe to assume, therefore,
acts in his own interest in connection with the performance of his duties as trustee, the standard of behavior becomes more rigorous." zA AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, Ta LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.25 (4th ed. 1987); see also Succession of Simpson, 31 1
So.2d 67, 72 (La. App. 1975).

73 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.zd 701 (Del. 1983).
74 Id. at703 (approving the substantive standard of unfairness of the merger terms to the
minority; allocating the ultimate burden of proof to the majority shareholders).
75 While the core of the intrinsic fairness rule is sensible and efficient, the Delaware
courts have made a mess of other matters relating to fiduciary duties. One such problem the
courts have had is in articulating a consistent and intelligible duty of care under the business judgment rule. See, e.g., William T.Allen, Jack Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the
Standardof Review of DirectorDue Care with Delaware PublicPolicy: A Critique of Van Gorkom
and its Progeny as a Standardof Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449, 453 (zoo2) (equating gross negligence with a "rationality standard," and then admitting that "Delaware courts
have chosen a definition of gross negligence [i.e., rationality] that is even more difficult for a
plaintiff to establish than the gross negligence standard normally applied in American tort or
criminal cases").
76 Bill Callison has suggested omitting all statutory fiduciary duties from statutes governing unincorporated associations. See Callison, supra note 16, at 485 ("state legislatures should
excise fiduciary duty statements from the [limited liability company] statutes they enact").
77 An example of how the common law process operating with a basic, broadly articulated rule of enhanced fiduciary duties in conflicted situations can result in good outcomes is
demonstrated by the development of the proportionality rule by the Delaware courts. The
proportionality standard, also referred to as the enhanced business judgment test or the Unocal
test, appeared in UnocalCorp.v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954-55 (Del. '985). Outside
of Unocal,the most prominent application of the standard was in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
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that most fully informed investors would insist on a loyalty standard that
offered protection against new and novel forms of conflicted managerial
misconduct and the chance of a remedy in the event that such misconduct
caused harm to them and their fellow investors.
A broadly articulated standard of loyalty also may promote more informed bargaining between managers and investors in unincorporated
business entities. The very breadth of such a rule will put more pressure
on managers attempting to opt out of the broad loyalty provision to include
more well-crafted, explicit opt out provisions in the partnership or LLC
operating agreement. Managers control the entity documents, and economic efficiency is enhanced by rules that provide an incentive for managers' documents to state clearly the rights of the parties.
Legislatures considering these uniform acts can improve fairness and
efficiency by making the four categories of prohibited conflicted conduct
non-exclusive, a matter that is easily accomplished by adding statutory language stating simply that the managers' duties of loyalty "include," but are
not limited to, the four categories.78 Fairness and efficiency are improved
because this approach more likely is the arrangement the parties would
have agreed upon, will enhance bargaining information by providing an incentive for the party controlling the documents-the entity's managersto include more specific opt out language in the partnership or operating
agreement, and will enable courts to offer remedies against new forms of
abusive conduct on the part of managers.
2. Opting Out of the Duty of Loyalty.-All three of the uniform acts provide
similar provisions for opting out of the statutory duty of loyalty provisions.
Each act requires the terms of the opt out and the reconstituted duties of

& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.zd 173, 18o (Del. 1985). The proportionality standard is based
on the accurate observation that corporate fiduciaries sometimes act in situations that are to
some extent conflicted but less so than the deep conflict that justifies the use of the intrinsic
fairness standard. The court in Unocalcharacterized these situations as involving a "specter"
of a conflict, ("omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests"), and, accordingly, developed a fiduciary standard that falls somewhere between business judgment and intrinsic fairness. UnocalGorp., 493 A.2d at 954. Under the proportionality standard, the quasi-conflicted corporate fiduciaries are held to a substantive standard of
negligence or reasonableness, Id. at 955, which is higher than the business judgment standard
of gross negligence but seemingly less strict than the intrinsic fairness substantive standard.
Procedurally, the proportionality test assigns the burden of proof to the quasi-conflicted fiduciary. Id. Generally, courts have limited the use of the proportionality rule to the evaluation
of board actions taken in response to unsolicited takeover bids. Butsee Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003) (applying the proportionality test in a friendly
acquisition).
78 Some states in the adoption of uniform acts have taken just this step. Kentucky is an
example of this. In adopting RUPA, Kentucky's legislature changed the loyalty provisions of
RUPA to state that the "partner's duty of loyalty ... includes but is not limited to" the exclusive categories of RUPA. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.1-404(2) (West 2007).
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loyalty to be contained in the partnership or LLC operating agreement.
The right to opt out of the duty of loyalty also is limited in that the parties
cannot entirely eliminate the duty of loyalty, and any reconstituted duty of
79
loyalty cannot be manifestly unreasonable.
The same principles used in Part II.A.2 of this paper to evaluate duty of
care opt out provisions are appropriately applicable to evaluate duty of loyalty opt out provisions. Restating those principles briefly: (1) opt out provisions generally tend to promote efficient and fair outcomes; (2) maximum
efficiency and fairness gains from opt out provisions require inexpensive
access to the opt out provisions and fully informed parties; and (3) efficiency and fairness goals may dictate a limit on the opt out right, if parties tend
to opt out of efficient arrangements into inefficient arrangements.
Loyalty opt out provisions create a significant opportunity for net efficiency gains80 by, for example, permitting parties to opt out of the prohibition against competing with the entity. Consider an illustration based
on experience from my own prior practice. In my last tour of duty as a
transactional lawyer, I used unincorporated business entities as vehicles
for constructing deals in the horse industry. A typical transaction involved
a limited or general partnership that was put together and managed by an
experienced horseman who in his personal capacity was involved in all or
most aspects of the horse business. This raised the possibility that the
manager of the partnership would compete with the partnership in breeding, buying, selling and racing horses. It was this very factor-the experience of the manager-that made the deal attractive to investors, however,
and it would have been nearly impossible to find a capable manager who
would not be in competition with the partnership. In short, opting out of
a prohibition of competition was an efficient term. It created value for the
parties.
The efficiency generating characteristics of loyalty opt outs are enhanced by the statutes' procedural simplicity. The only procedural requirements in the statutes are that any loyalty opt out term must be specific and
contained in the partnership or LLC operating agreement.8" As a result,
loyalty opt outs can be accessed without undue costs, which promotes ef8
ficiency.
79 See APPENDIX A infra.
8o Broadly available loyalty opt out rights, at least in my view, create more of an opportunity for efficiency gains than do broadly available duty of care opt out rights. As described in
Part II.A.z., permitting parties to reduce the standard of care below a gross negligence standard generates net inefficiencies, since it is highly unlikely that fully informed parties would
agree to such an extremely lax standard of care. See supra notes 6o-62 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, broad flexibility to opt out of the loyalty obligation can generate value
for the parties, as is demonstrated in my example based on my practice in the horse industry,
which immediately follows in the text.
81 See APPENDIX A infra.

82 See supra note 30 and notes 50-55 and accompanying textual discussion.
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The requirements that the opt out terms be specific and contained in
the partnership or LLC operating agreement also enhance efficiency by
promoting more fully informed decision making by the parties, most importantly on the part of investors. Requiring the opt out to be included
in the partnership or LLC agreement increases the probability that the3
investors will know of and, hopefully, understand the terms of the opt OUt.1
The probability that investors are fully informed is further increased by a
specificity requirement, which states that the opt out "may not ...eliminate the duty of loyalty... but ...may identify specific types or categories
of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty. ...", This specificity
requirement means, for example, that generalized language, such as, "partners [managers] shall owe no duty of loyalty to the partnership [LLC] or
the partners [members]," would be unenforceable. Managers attempting
to opt out of a portion of the duty of loyalty, therefore, have a strong incentive to convey to investors full information about the scope of the opt out.
While these provisions move the parties toward more complete information respecting loyalty opt outs, further improvement on the matter of information asymmetry could be made by using the same technique proposed
in Part II.A.2 of this paper in regard to duty of care opt outs. Specifically,
the Acts governing partnerships, limited partnerships and LLCs should
also predicate any opt out of the duty of loyalty on the disclosure of the opt
out on the outside front cover page of the partnership or LLC operating
agreement. At a minimum, that disclosure should prominently, concisely
and in plain English describe the terms of the loyalty opt out and, if necessary, cross-reference more detailed opt out provisions elsewhere in the
agreement. Otherwise, managers who control the entity documents once
again have the incentive and opportunity to bury loyalty opt out terms in
the middle of a long and complex partnership or LLC operating agreement, which may allow managers to exploit their85informational advantage
by means of an inefficient bargain with investors.
Finally, the statutes' "manifestly unreasonable" limitation on the loyalty opt out right seems appropriate in this case. In the duty of care situation, a more strictly limited opt out right is justified because of the likelihood that very few fully informed parties would ever agree to a standard
of care that absolved managers of liability for an extreme deviation from
ordinary care. As a result, no significant efficiency gains were apparent by
permitting the parties to opt into such extremely lax standards of care. In
83 While partnership and LLC operating agreements may be oral,see,e.g., RUPA § 101(7)
(defining a partnership agreement as an "agreement, whether written, oral or implied"), even
in that case it seems likely that managers attempting to opt out of the loyalty rules would produce some written record to support their opt out claim. See supranote 53 and accompanying
text of opting out of the duty of care.
84 See, e.g., RUPA § 103(b), at APPENDIX A infra.
85 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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the case of duty of loyalty opt out standards, however, broad and generous standards are essential to enable parties to construct the many efficiency enhancing arrangements that they may desire, and a standard set at
manifestly unreasonable may be about right in that regard. The example
I used above-a partnership where the partners waive the loyalty prohibition against competition-is only one example of the efficiency generating
effect of broad loyalty opt out provisions. 86 Parties must be permitted substantial flexibility in order to construct the myriad of efficiency generating
loyalty opt outs that will suit their particular preferences and thus generate
economic value.
To maximize the efficiencies created by such a broad opt out right, however, it is essential that the opt out be coupled with provisions that provide
strong incentives for full information sharing among the parties at the point
of the opt out. The provisions described above-requiring that the opt out
be in specific terms and be included in the partnership or LLC operating
agreement, and adding a requirement that the opt out be prominently disclosed on the outside front cover page of the partnership or LLC operating
agreement-become even more important because of the broad and generous loyalty opt out rights.
In summary, the broad loyalty opt out provisions found in ULLCA,
RUPA and ULPA (2001) generally tend to promote efficient and fair outcomes. The provisions allow a low cost opt out and are structured in a
way to enhance the extent to which the parties exercising the opt out are
fully informed. As was the case with the duty of care opt out, however, full
information on the part of parties could be further enhanced by conditioning any loyalty opt out on a prominent, concise and intelligible statement
of the opt out on the outside front cover page of the partnership or LLC
operating agreement.
CONCLUSION

Somewhere along the way, the uniform unincorporated business statutesULLCA, RUPA and ULPA (2001)-got off track in the area of fiduciary duties. A public choice analysis suggests that the misdirection was the result
of the fact that managers of unincorporated business entities as a group
were best able to overcome collective action problems and thus bend the
uniform acts to their preferences.
The unfortunate result is that the uniform acts facilitate managers'
creation of inefficient and self-serving bargains between themselves and
86 Referring back to my experience in practice of putting together deals in the horse
industry, see supra note 8o and accompanying text, managers in those deals not only were
typically in competition with the partnership but also were selling products and services to
the partnership, in the form, for example, of boarding and foaling services. Once again, these
arrangements created value for the parties.
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investors regarding managers' fiduciary duties. The default rules are inefficient and unduly pro-management, and the statutory opt out provisions
enable the creation of even more inefficient and pro-management terms.
Operating under the uniform acts, managers of unincorporated business
entities can exploit their informational and strategic advantages and generate untoward pecuniary gains for themselves at the expense of investors.
This is a matter of some importance for the economy and society.
Millions of small businesses operate as partnerships and LLCs,87 and small
businesses are a vital part of our economy. They provide many essential
services and products in our society and employment for millions of workers. Data from the Small Business Administration show, for example, that
nearly twenty percent of all employment in the United States is provided
by small firms having less than twenty employees. 88 Research also suggests
that small businesses are vehicles for much of the entrepreneurial initiative
so important for a market economy.8 9 Society needs efficient and fair rules
of governance and capital formation for this very important portion of our
economy.
In future revisions of the uniform acts, NCCUSL Committees will have
the opportunity to change the Acts' inefficient and pro-management fiduciary duty provisions, as will state legislatures when in the future they
adopt or amend any of the uniform acts. These important societal rule
makers-NCCUSL and state legislatures-should be guided by morally
attractive, consent-based principles, principles that will lead to enhanced
fairness and efficiency in regard to the fiduciary duties of managers of unincorporated business entities.

87 See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CASES AND MATERIALS 499 (9 th ed. 2005) (describing the numbers of general partnerships,
limited partnerships and LLCs and the extreme growth in the numbers of LLCs in recent
years).
88 See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE SMALL BUSINESS
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 2005, at 216-I, Table A.5 (2oo5), available at http:/I
www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb-econ200s.pdf. According to the data, in 2002, the last year
included in the REPORT, 18.3% of all employees in the United States were employed in busi-
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ness firms that had less than twenty employees. The total number of persons employed by
these small firms was 20,583,371. Id.
89 See id. at 183-204. "This paper has gone beyond the observation that breakthrough advance in technology is predominately a small firm specialty. There is a good deal of evidence
that this has been the case for over a century and that it continues to be so today." Id. at 204.
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APPENDIX A
Section 404 of the RUPA states:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the
other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is
limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding
up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an
interest adverse to the partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership.
(c) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
(d) A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any
rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
(e) A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under
the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers
the partner's own interest.
(f) A partner may lend money to and transact other business with the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction the rights and obligations of the
partner are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to
other applicable law.
(g) This section applies to a person winding up the partnership business
as the personal or legal representative of the last surviving partner as if the
person were a partner.
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Section 103 of the RUPA states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the
partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by
the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does
not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and
between the partners and the partnership.
(b) The partnership agreement may not:
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b).. ., but:
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not
manifestly unreasonable; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure
of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise
would violate the duty of loyalty;
(4) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 404(c) or
603(b)(3)...
Section 408 of the ULPA (2001) states:
(a) The only fiduciary duties that a general partner owes to the limited
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and care under
subsections (b) and (c).
(b) A general partner's duty of loyalty to the limited partnership and the
other partners is limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding
up of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of
partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an
interest adverse to the partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership.
(c) A general partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners
in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
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(d) A general partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and other
partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise
any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
(e) A general partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act]
or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct
furthers the partner's own interest.
Section 110 of the ULPA (2001) states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the partnership agreement governs relations among the partners and between the partners and
the partnership. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and between
the partners and the partnership.
(b) A partnership agreement may not:
(5) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 408, but the partnership
agreement may:
(A) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and
(B) specify the number or percentage specified of partners which
may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure to all the partners of
all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would
violate the duty of loyalty;
(6) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 408(c).
Section 409 of the ULLCA states:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a member owes to a member-managed company and its other members are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care
imposed by subsections (b) and (c).
(b) A member's duty of loyalty to a member-managed company and its
other members is limited to the following:
(1) to account to the company and to hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the member in the conduct or winding up
of the company's business or derived from a use by the member of the
company's property, including the appropriation of a company's opportunity.
(2) to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding
up of the company's business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the company; and
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(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of the
company's business before the dissolution of the company.
(c) A member's duty of care to a member-managed company and its other
members in the conduct of and winding up of the company's business is
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
(d) A member shall discharge the duties to a member-managed company
and its other members under this [Act] or under the operating agreement
and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.
(e) A member of a member- managed company does not violate a duty or
obligation under this [Act] or under the operating agreement merely because the member's conduct furthers the member's own interest.
(f) A member of a member-managed company may lend money to and
transact other business with the company. As to each loan or transaction,
the rights and obligations of the member are the same as those of a person
who is not a member, subject to other applicable law.
(g) This section applies to a person winding up the limited liability company's business as the personal or legal representative of the surviving member as if the person were a member.
(h) In a manager-managed company:
(1) a member who is not also a manager owes no duties to the company
or to the other members solely by reason of being a member;
(2) a member is held to the same standards of conduct prescribed for
members in subsections (b) through (f);
(3) a member who pursuant to the operating agreement exercises some
or all of the rights of a manager in the management and conduct of the
company's business is held to the standards of conduct in subsections
(b) and through (f) to the extent that the member exercises the managerial authority vested in a manager by this [Act]; and
(4) a member is relieved of liability imposed by law for violation of the
standards prescribed by subsections (b) through (f) to the extent of the
managerial authority delegated to the members by the operating agreement.
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Section 103 of the ULLCA provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), all members of a limited
liability company may enter into an operating agreement, which need not
be in writing, to regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of its
business, and to govern relations among the members, managers, and company. To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide,
this [Act] governs relations among the members, managers, and company.
(b) The operating agreement may not:
(2) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 409(b)..., but the agreement may:
(i) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and
(ii) specify the number or percentage specified of partners that
may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a
specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of
loyalty;
(3) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 409 (c) or
603(b)(3).

